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Abstract 
The phenomenon of cheating among academics is of overwhelming importance in that the 
students engaging in it are most unlikely to have the skills necessary for their future 
professional life. Despite its relevance, the empirical evaluation of college cheating has been 
almost exclusively focused on the US context. Little is known about college cheating at the 
European level let alone Portugal. Less even in investigated at the regional level. In this paper 
we present evidence on cheating perception by Portuguese undergraduate students of 
economics and business courses. We undertake a large scale survey, involving 2675 students 
from all Portuguese mainland public universities. We found that (1) the likelihood of copying 
is increased when the expected benefit in terms of grade is positive; (2) copying-favourable 
environments – the high frequency with which students observe the act of copying, familiarity 
with someone that copies regularly, and the students’ opinion regarding copying – are 
associated with higher cheating propensity; (3) the higher and more serious students perceive 
sanctions, fewer incentives they have to perpetrate dishonest behaviours – in universities 
where ‘codes of honour’ exist, the propensity for copying among students is lower; (4) the 
propensity for copying seems to be highly influenced by regions’ cultural systems and social 
related factors - students who reside on a permanent basis in southern, inland regions, 
especially in Alentejo-related areas, present a significantly higher propensity to academic 
fraud than students from other areas of Portugal.  
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  11. Introduction 
Through its effect on the quality of the education system, cheating influences the assessment 
of the stock of human capital, since this is usually achieved on the basis of the "quantity" and 
"quality" of education (Barro and Lee, 2000; Hanushek and Kimbo, 2000; Teixeira, 2005). 
Cheating tends to reduce the efficiency of a country’s education system by distorting honest 
competition among students (Magnus et al., 2002). 
The phenomenon of cheating among academics is of overwhelming importance in that the 
students engaging in it are most unlikely to have the skills necessary for their future 
professional life and awarding a degree to these individuals leads to various levels of damage. 
Indeed, the production of unfit professionals leads to "social ills", since these future 
professionals will not be able to perform properly, possibly resulting in several types of 
damages both to other professionals in the same area and to the institution that trained them. 
What is more, the whole educational environment can also be affected, since the importance 
of cheating means that more effort has to be spent controlling it, and this effort could be better 
applied to learning (Dick et al., 2003). 
Cheating is a concept that is hard to define. Dick et al. (2003) mentions a wide range of 
possible kinds of cheating, deciding that, on the whole, cheating results in the breach of 
defined and accepted rules and standards. Copying in examinations is one form of cheating 
widely alluded to in studies dealing with cheating (e.g. Bunn et al., 1992; McCabe and 
Trevino, 1997; Tibbetts, 1999; Sheard and Dick, 2003; Hrabak et al., 2004). 
Despite its recognised importance, the empirical evaluation of the cheating phenomenon 
among university students have been almost exclusively focused on the US context, 
embracing usually a few universities in a given region. Those non-US related studies involve 
a narrow scope of countries/regions, namely, from outside Europe, Australia, Japan, Israel, 
and Russia, and, from Europe, The Netherlands and Croatia. In this context, it is fair to say 
that little is known about the cheating phenomenon at the European level in general and in 
Portugal in particular. In this paper we aim to provide a contribution to filling this gap by 
presenting evidence on this illegal behaviour in Portugal, as well as an analysis from an until 
now under-researched perspective, the region.  
Controlled by the region where the student resides (on a permanent basis) and added to the 
determinants of copying normally focused on in the existing literature, we propose a new, 
broader, econometric specification that includes a variable which quantifies the relevance and 
  2magnitude of the ‘benefits’ that students see themselves as gaining by cheating, in terms of a 
better grade in comparison with not cheating. Moreover, another, ‘contextual’, determinant is 
also suggested, of the probability of copying - whether or not the educational establishments 
have a code of honour. 
This paper is organised as follows. The next section surveys existing studies on the topic of 
cheating. In Section 3 the methodology for collecting the data is described and the following 
section (Section 4) presents the econometric specification used for evaluating the 
phenomenon and the results. The last section concludes by discussing the main results of the 
study. 
2. On the determinants of cheating behaviour: a review 
With Becker’s seminal study (1968) the economics of crime gained renewed importance. 
Formalising illegal behaviours in terms of a cost-benefit analysis, Becker (1968) defends the 
economic rationality of people committing criminal acts. He believes that criminal behaviour 
results from the maximization of the individual utility function in certain risk situations. 
Crimes are thus only committed if the resulting gains outweigh the expected punishment 
(Garoupa, 2001). There are other complementary forms of theorising illegal behaviour, as 
described by Ehrlich (1973) and Wolpin (1978), for example. The first study can be viewed as 
a model for taking individual decisions relating to the time allocation variable, consisting of 
an analysis that follows the same line of reasoning as Becker’s model (1968) (decisions 
weighted for costs and benefits), improving some aspects associated with the model through 
their exploration not only of the question of costs, but of benefits, too. In addition, Ehrlich's 
model (1973) makes it possible to forecast the direction of changes between legal versus 
illegal activities, as well as the magnitude of each of these activities (Horvath and 
Kolomaznikova, 2002). The studies by Becker, Ehrlich and Wolpin are among the more 
formal approaches, regarded as pioneering, in the analysis of the economics of crime.  
More recent studies on cheating (e.g. Bunn, Caudill and Gropper, 1992; Kekvliet and 
Sigmund, 1999) are of an essentially empirical nature. They are based on econometric 
specifications consistent with the assumption of a relation between fraudulent behaviour and 
the notion of costs and benefits resulting from it. So these studies are adaptations of Becker’s 
crime model to academic dishonesty.
1
                                                 
1 Rocha and Teixeira (2005) account for the distinct forms of theorizing illegal behaviours and adapt Becker’s 
crime model (1968) to cheating. 
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(cf. Table 1) show that the dimension of cheating is considerable – over one third. One of the 
pioneering studies by Bunn et al. (1992), concerning an analysis of two higher education 
courses in Microeconomics in Alabama (US), the authors found that half the students 
surveyed admitted to having copied. They also found that cheating was ‘normal’ among 
students, with 80% of them saying that they had seen a colleague copying and half of them 
said that they had seen a colleague being caught copying. Apart from the magnitude of the 
phenomenon, unlawful behaviour seems to be quite well ‘interiorised’ in the student 
community, with 28% of students admitting to knowing colleagues who copy regularly. The 
vast incidence of the phenomenon seems to be justified by the fact that most students (70%) 
do not see copying as a serious offence.  
In another context (two public universities in the US) and looking at more courses (six 
Economics classes), Kerkvliet (1994) collected data in two different ways (direct response 
and random response questionnaires), and found that in the random response questionnaire 
(which he felt guaranteed greater confidentiality and thus more honest answers), 42% of 
students indicated they had copied at least once in an exam.  
In a later study, covering 12 classes in the two universities, Kerkvliet and Sigmund (1999) 
estimated that an average of 12.8% of the students surveyed had copied at least once. But 
there was considerable disparity among the groups, ranging from 0.2% in the least ‘deceitful’ 
class and 32% in the one where cheating was most common. The authors say this disparity is 
due to the different measures of "intimidation" used in the various classes (number of tests per 
student that watch out for discipline in the universities; space per student in the classroom; 
number of test versions used by the teacher; kind of exam).  
Taking a larger population than that in the Bunn et al. (1992) study, Nowell and Laufer 
(1997) looked at two higher courses in the USA (Economics and Accounting) and concluded 
that the average propensity for dishonesty was around 27%. 
More recently, and with reference to other scientific areas, findings by Sheard and Dick 
(2003) in a study on postgraduate students in Information Technology at a university in 
Melbourne (Australia) showed that 9% of students admitted to being involved in serious 
forms of cheating in exams. In other study on unlawful behaviour among students from the 
2
nd to the 6
th year of Medicine, in a Croatian university, Hrabak et al. (2004) found that 94% 
admitted to having committed some kind of deceit at least once during their studies. When it 
  4came to copying answers or using ‘cheat sheets’, the percentages were 52.2% and 34.6%, 
respectively. A considerable percentage (66.4%) of Psychology and Management students in 
three Dutch universities admitted to have cheated (Bernardi et al., 2004). 
Table 1: Magnitude of academic dishonesty among students 
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Medical Sciences   Croatia (1) (Zagreb)  827  34.6%-52.2% 








Separate studies (including those cited above) systematically indicate a series of determinants 
for academic dishonesty. These may be grouped into factors associated with student 
characteristics, factors related to the institution, variables influencing the likelihood of the 
phenomenon being detected and the respective cost of detection, and also causes associated 
with the benefits of copying (when they are not caught) and the benefits of not copying. Table 
2 gives an overview of the different factors, by group, mentioned in the literature. 
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Groups of determinants  Determinants  Studies 
Students characteristics 
   Gender 
   Average course grade 
   Consumption of alcohol 
   Academic year of studies 
   Religious preference  
   Student Status 
   Have failed at least a year 
   Moral factors and kind of personality 
   Motivation and competence 
Kerkvliet (1994) 
Nowell and Laufer (1997) 
Whitey (1998) 
Kerkvliet and Sigmund (1999) 
Tibbetts (1999) 
Bernardi et al. (2004) 
Hrabak et al. (2004) 
Rettinger et al. (2004) 
Factors related with the education 
institution  
   Dimension and level of class 
   Category of teachers  
   Existence of an “honour code” 
   Classroom environment 
Nowell and Laufer (1997) 
Whitey (1998) 
Pulvers and Diekhoff (1999) 
Kerkvliet and Sigmund (1999) 
McCabe et al. (2003) 
Cost of detecting academic dishonesty 
   Teachers’ academic category 
   Existence of verbal warnings regarding 
the resultant consequences of copying in 
exams 
Bunn et al. (1992) 
Kerkvliet and Sigmund (1999) 
Probability of detecting copying 
   Number of tests by students with the goal 
of maintaining good behaviour 
   Geographic class occupation by student 
   Number of exams versions utilized by 
instructor  
   Type of exams 
Kerkvliet and Sigmund (1999) 
Benefits of copying (in the case of not being 
caught) 
   Expected classification  
   Number of “free” hours for the student 
during the term 
   Type of Courses 
Whitey (1998) 
Kerkvliet and Sigmund (1999) 
Benefits of not copying     Average number of weekly hours of 
study 
Kerkvliet (1994) 
Kerkvliet and Sigmund (1999) 
Others factors 
   Students’ opinion of those that copy or 
commit other types of academic 
dishonesty  
   Students perception in light of the 
percentage of students that copy and of 
rival group behaviours 
   Intensity of Work (“Workload”) 
   Pressure not to fail 
   Type of courses  
   Country /region 
   Students’ background 
   Students’ origin 
Bunn et al. (1992) 
Kerkvliet (1994) 
McCabe and Trevino (1997) 
Nowell and Laufer (1997) 
Whitey (1998) 
Diekhoff et al. (1999) 
Magnus et al. (2002) 
Sheard and Dick (2003) 
Hrabak et al. (2004) 
The average course mark is a cheating determinant used in most of the studies – Bunn et al. 
(1992), Kerkvliet (1994), Nowell and Laufer (1997), Kerkvliet and Sigmund (1999) and 
Hrabak et al. (2004) – although its (statistic) significance is seldom found. Usually a negative 
relation is expected between this variable and copying in an exam as it is reckoned that 
students with a high course average would have less to gain from copying than those with a 
lower average. Although Bunn at al.’s results confirm this assumption, many authors 
(Kerkvliet, 1994; Nowell and Laufer, 1997; and Kerkvliet and Sigmund, 1999) did not find 
the course average statistically significant. Notwithstanding, Hrabak et al. (2004) argue that 
the course average could be relevant in explaining attitudes to cheating. They take the view 
that students with a higher average have a more negative attitude to copying than those with a 
lower one, and further disapprove of swapping questions by phone during an exam, and using 
personal relations to pass an exam. 
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important than students’ average grade/mark, a critical determinant of the propensity to cheat 
is students’ perceived ‘benefits’, in terms of a higher grade, which they expect if they copy 
successfully. In this line, we aim at testing the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of copying is increased when the difference between the 
mark/grade students expect if they copy is positive when compared with the 
mark/grade that they expect if they do not copy.  
Hypothesis 2: The probability of copying is higher the greater the difference between the 
mark students says they expect if they do in fact copy and the mark if no copying 
takes place. 
Contextual factors and the environment-pear pressure and attitudes towards academic 
dishonesty are also other conditioning factors for the development of unlawful academic 
practices. In fact, Bunn et al. (1992) found that the likelihood of copying is directly related to 
observing others doing so, and the perception of the number of students who routinely copy. 
In other words, the probability of a student having already copied is conditioned by his/her 
beliefs in relation to other students who copy. Furthermore, these authors assess the 
perception students have regarding the severity of the punishment applied if they are caught 
copying and use this and indicators of the climate of cheating perceived by students to 
evaluate their perception of the percentage who copy. They find evidence for the belief among 
students that, given the negligible effect of intimidation attached to expected punishments, 
they are very unlikely to be caught copying. In addition they find that students do not think 
copying is a serious crime, which could contribute to a greater incidence of this phenomenon. 
Hypothesis 3: In copying-favourable environments where permissibility and permeability 
towards copying is high, students’ propensity for copying tends to be higher. 
Hypothesis 4: The higher and more serious the perceived sanctions are, fewer incentives 
students have to perpetrating dishonest behaviours. 
Although McCabe et al. (2003) do not analyse directly the influence of codes of honour on 
the probability of copying, they examine whether this variable has an effect on the academic 
integrity of university staff in terms of their attitudes and behaviours. The analysis is based on 
universities with and without codes of honour. The authors found that universities which have 
a code of honour have more positive attitudes towards policies of academic integrity and are 
more willing to allow the system to take measures to warn and discipline students. 
  7Furthermore, they confirmed that, in the absence of a code of honour, university faculty 
members with this experience believe in students being responsible for monitoring their 
colleagues, recognising the fairness and efficiency of their institutions’ policies of academic 
integrity. Following this line of argument we hypothesise here that:  
Hypothesis 5: In universities where ‘codes of honour’ exist, the propensity for copying among 
students is lower. 
Differences in social factors are likely to comprise an important factor in explaining students’ 
propensity to cheat. For instance, Diekhoff et al. (1999) detect differences and similarities in 
American and Japanese students copying in exams. Weighting the limitation associated with 
the distinct composition of the two samples (both in terms of size and associated with various 
demographic characteristics, such as gender, age and school year), the data show that in 
comparison with the Americans, the Japanese students are more prone to copy in exams. With 
regard to with social involvement, Diekhoff et al. (1999) consider that if copying is viewed as 
widespread, it is harder for Japanese students to resist to the pressure of copying or to help 
their colleagues to copy, given the group and team orientation among Japanese students. In a 
complementary way, Magnus et al. (2002) conducted an experiment on students in secondary, 
higher and postgraduate education, in 5 different regions - Moscow, Russia (province), the 
Netherlands, the USA and Israel - and show that both the level of teaching and the zone lead 
to students having distinct opinions relative to academic dishonesty. On average, Russian 
students are against denouncers, contrary to the views held by the American students on the 
same behaviour. It was also found, on average, and except for Russia, that secondary school 
pupils are less tolerant of denouncing when compared with students in higher education, and 
these are less tolerant than postgraduates. 
To our best knowledge, no study has so far been conducted focusing on a cross-regional 
analysis of academic dishonesty. Thus little is known about this behaviour among university 
students coming from different regions of a given country. We hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 6: The propensity to copy is influenced by the regions’ cultural systems and 
socially-related factors. 
It is important here to point out that there are other factors indicated in the literature that may 
influence dishonest behaviour in students, such as gender (Kerkvliet, 1994; Nowell and 
Laufer, 1997; Kerkvliet and Sigmund, 1999; Tibbets, 1999; Hrabak et al., 2004), year of 
study (Nowell and Laufer, 1997; Kerkvliet and Sigmund, 1999; Hrabak et al., 2004), and 
  8student status (Nowell and Laufer, 1997). However the incidence and the strength of these 
variables are not consensual or clear cut. 
3. Methodology for quantifying the phenomenon of academic dishonesty 
The main problem linked to the analysis of cheating in academia lies in the fact that it is hard 
to measure, and researchers have generally used their own information to assess this type of 
behaviour (Nowell and Laufer, 1997). There are four ways to obtain data on academic 
dishonesty (Kerkvliet and Sigmund, 1999): direct yet discrete observation of the data; the 
“overlapping error” method; the random answer questions method, and inquiry via the direct 
questions method. In the present work we have opted for the latter method. Although this 
method takes no account of problems associated with sensitivity to the kind of questions 
asked (like the random answers method), meaning that it can induce deviation in the estimates 
of academic dishonesty (Kerkvliet and Sigmund, 1999), it does have simplicity of 
implementation in its favour, and a wealth of output for analysis. This is why it is often the 
procedure used (Bunn et al., 1992; Magnus et al., 2002; Sheard and Dick, 2003; Hrabak et al., 
2004).
2
We have devised a one page inquiry in line with Bunn et al. (1992) embracing a range of 
questions focusing the main determinants associated with academic fraudulent behaviour, 
adding new variables/questions which in our view are likely to influence the propensity to 
copy (cf. Section 2).  
The questionnaire was implemented in all (10) Portuguese public Universities, namely to 




th) the classes with the highest number of enrolled students were 
selected and the questionnaire was given to students in the classrooms. The survey was 
conducted between March and December 2005 and resulted in 2675 valid responses. 
4. University cheating in Portugal. An exploratory analysis of the data 
Based on the studies described in Section 2, we can mention that the phenomenon of cheating 
in the Universities analysed reached a relatively high level. In fact, from the students 
surveyed, 62% admitted to having copied at least once. Only the study by Hrabak et al. 
(2004), focusing on Medicine School students, presents a higher number (94%). However, 
this has to do with the fact that the latter study includes under the concept of cheating a set of 
                                                 
2 Roca and Teixeira (2005) provide a detailed description of the different methods, presenting their relative 
strengths and weaknesses. 
  9unlawful practices which go beyond copying (e.g., signing attendance records for a 
colleague); regarding copying practices Hrabak et al. point to figures between 34.6% and 
52.2% (see Table 1). Other more comparable studies to ours, such as for example, Bunn et al. 
(1992) present a more similar number, even though it is lower (50%). 
Generally speaking, in terms of the characteristics of the students surveyed, the data collected 
points to a slightly higher probability to ‘copy’ among male students (62.9% against 61.4% of 
female students) and with intermediary ages. As can be seen in the next graph, students aged 
20 to 25 (representing about 75.5% of the total students surveyed) registered a probability to 
cheat ranging between 61.2% and 70.6%, much higher than the 55.1% registered among 
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Graph 1: Probability of ‘copying’ by age group 
Source: Calculations made by the authors based on direct questionnaires conducted 
in the periods February-December 2005. 
Related with the age group is the school year in which the student is enrolled. In this case, the 
results show a strong relationship between the propensity to copy and coming closer to 
concluding the degree. Students enrolled in the final year (4
th year) reveal a 68% probability 
to copy whereas their colleagues in the 2
nd year registered 56.5%. 
Most of the students surveyed (89.1%) are ‘Regular/Normal Students’. Association Members 
(AMs) and Working Students (WSs) count for, respectively, 3.1% and 6.7% of all the 
students surveyed.
3 The latter two groups admitted to a greater propensity to practice 
dishonest acts academically, namely 66.3% (AMs) and 65.1% (WSs), against the 62.1% of 
the so-called ‘regular’ students, which may possibly reveal that AMs and WSs have less time 
to dedicate to study. 
                                                 
3 There is another category, ‘Others’, which includes loosely speaking students from the Portuguese-speaking 
Countries, Erasmus students, Armed Forces, etc., who represent 1.1% of the students surveyed. 
  10The data in this exploratory analysis seem to confirm existing studies on the inverse relation 
between student’s performance (proxied by the average academic grade) and the respective 
propensity to cheat. In fact, as can be seen in Graph 2, the students with a better academic 
performance (average grade of 16 or higher on a scale from 0 – 20) admit on average to a 
propensity to copy of 37%, a number which is far below the one of their less brilliant 









Copying propensity %total responses  
Graph 2: Probability of ‘copying’ according to academic performance 
Source: Idem Graph 1. 
It is interesting to analyse the degree of heterogeneity of the phenomenon of cheating in 
regional terms, namely when applying the territorial nomenclatures NUTs II and III. In this 
survey, the students were asked to identify the respective municipality of permanent 
residence. Although 8% of the students did not answer this question, the valid answers (2416) 
allowed for a sound analysis of the relationship between the student’s ‘geographic origin’, 
i.e., the socio-cultural context of origin and the respective behaviour in what concerns 
cheating. 
As can be seen in Table 3, the criterion for regional division by NUTs II reveals that most of 
the students surveyed (42.8%) come from the Northern region, followed by the students from 
the Centre (22.3%) and those from Lisbon and the Tagus Valley (22.3%), which follows 
closely the regional distribution of enrolled students.
4
                                                 
4 The average ‘response rate’ (total students surveyed over total students enrolled) was 37.5%, ranging from a 
minimum of 17.3% to a maximum of 52.0%. It is important to stress that this ‘response rate’ is underestimated 
as we consider students enrolled in classes that comprised the highest number of enrolments in a given year; 
thus, it is highly likely that these classes have students from several schooling years due to retentions. 
  11Table 3: NUTs II regional distribution of the propensity to copy (in %) 
% total students in each region 
 




% total students 
surveyed (n=2416) 
North 38.3  59.1  2.6  61.7  42.8 
Centre 40.0  58.3  1.7  60.0  22.3 
Lisbon and Tagus Valley  39.2  58.7  2.1  60.8  22.3 
Alentejo 19.9  74.4  5.7  80.1  7.4 
Algarve 45.4  53.7  0.9  54.6  4.5 
Azores  50.0 37.5 12.5  50.0  0.3 
Madeira 41.7  58.3  0.0  58.3  0.5 
Source: Calculations made by the authors based on direct questionnaires to students, in the periods February-December 2005. 
Based on the numbers presented in Table 3, we can conclude that it is the Alentejo region’s 
students who admitted to having copied with the highest probability (80.1%). 
Notwithstanding, the students from the Autonomous Regions of the Azores were those who, 
in greater percentage (12.5%), admitted to committing this act ‘often or always’. It was also 
the students from this region, together with those from the Algarve, who stated in the highest 
percentage that they had never copied. 
As can be seen on the map, students from the NUTs III Pinhal Interior Norte, Beira Interior 
Sul, Lezíria do Tejo, Alentejo Litoral, Alto Alentajo and Alentejo Central are those who in 
greater numbers (over 78.9%) admitted to having copied ‘at some time’. At the extreme 
opposite (propensity to copy less than 57.1%), are the NUTs III, Alto Trás-os-Montes, Baixo 
Mondego, Pinhal Litoral, Serra da Estrela, Península de Setúbal and Algarve.
5 With a higher 
frequency of answers (20% and 15% of the total surveyed), Grande Porto and Grande Lisboa 
are located in the ‘average-lower’ group of propensity to copy, presenting similar percentages, 
even though they are lower in Grande Porto (57.1% against 58.9% for Grande Lisboa). 
Thus, despite the fact that the magnitude of the phenomenon of cheating is significant in all 
the NUTs III regions (all presenting numbers over 50%), there seems to be a certain amount 
of heterogeneity of behaviours in what concerns the intensity of this illegal behaviour, 
denoting at the outset the relevance of socio-cultural factors associated to the student’s 
geographic origin. 
                                                 
5 The Autonomous Region of the Azores (not represented in the graph) is included in the group of NUTs with 
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Graph 3: Mapping of cheating in Continental Portugal by NUTs III 
Source: Calculations made by the authors based on direct questionnaires to students in 
the periods February-December 2005. 
An analysis of the cheating phenomenon can also be conducted from the perspective of the 
perception students have in relation to the associated context, which can be analysed by the 
frequency with which the practice of copying occurs, by the awareness of other students who 
copy regularly and the by opinion held on the importance of the act of copying in the 
respective University. 
Notwithstanding that 62% of the students surveyed admitted to having at some time practiced 
the act of copying, direct observation on the part of those same students of other colleagues 
cheating is admitted by almost all the students surveyed (92.5%). This reflects great 
familiarity with the phenomenon on the part of students in Economics and Management in 
Portuguese public higher education. 
  13An analysis of Table 4 allows us to characterise the phenomenon of “observing cheating” by 
NUTs II. Although greater in magnitude, the percentage of students who have at some time 
seen others copying corresponds in terms of scale to the student’s propensity to copy. In fact, 
it is in the Algarve and the Autonomous Region of the Azores that a lower percentage of 
students (88% and 75%, respectively) admitted to having seen other colleagues commit an 
unlawful act. On the other hand, the Alentejo appears here again as the region where cheating 
seems more widespread. Note that slightly over 90% of the students surveyed with permanent 
residence in the Northern Region have seen other students copying, where 68.3% of the 
observations were ‘sporadic’ and 23.4% stated that it was seen ‘often or always’. 
Table 4: Probability of “seeing other students copying” (in %) by NUTs II 
% total surveyed in each region 
 





% of students in 
each region 
North 8.3  68.3  23.4  91.7  42.8 
Centre 6.7  69.4  23.9  93.3  22.3 
Lisbon and Tagus Valle  7.1  71.6  21.3  92.9  22.3 
Alentejo 2.8  63.5  33.7  97.2  7.4 
Algarve 12.0  61.1  26.9  88.0  4.5 
Azores 25.0  62.5  12.5  75.0  0.3 
Madeira 0.0  58.3  41.7  100.0  0.5 
Source: Calculations made by the authors based on direct questionnaires to students in the periods February-December 2005. 
It is interesting to note that on the aggregate the percentage (23.9%) of students who state 
they have regularly seen someone (known or not) copying is far lower than the percentage of 
those who admitted to knowing someone who copies regularly (59.4%). This means a relative 
familiarity with the phenomenon of copying and its generalised occurrence among the group 
of ‘friends’ of the student surveyed, and therefore a relative permissiveness in relation to the 
issue. In fact, although ‘copying’ is considered by about half the students a serious problem 
(11.3%) or at least an issue that deserves some attention (37.3%), most of the student 
population (51.4%) considers that the practice of ‘copying’ is not really a problem or is 
merely a minor problem without much relevance. 
In terms of elements associated to the perception of the sanctions associated with cheating, 
about half the students stated that they have already seen other students being caught 
cheating. However, the individual acknowledgement that this practice has been detected is far 
lower, only 5% admitted to having been caught at any time. Given the magnitude of the 
phenomenon of copying and especially the fact that it is generally observed by many of the 
  14students, from the data collected, it seems that being caught cheating does not carry serious 
sanctions, outside the test/exam setting where the cheating took place. As a matter of fact, a 
large majority of university students (83.3%) expect that, if caught copying, the highest 
sanction applied be that of having the test annulled (62%) and possibly not being allowed to 
take other exams in the subject during that academic year (21.3%), which in practical terms, 
corresponds to failing the subject. 
An important aspect which highlights the need for means to prevent copying (e.g., 
supervisors) derives from the fact that 52.6% of the students surveyed admitted that in the 
absence of supervisors or other types of sanctions, they would dedicate less time to study. 
Even more disquieting is the fact that about 30% of the students stated that they would 
dedicate 40% or over less time to study than usual if supervisors were absent from exams. 
When taking into account the percentage of students who have admitted to having copied at 
some time (62%), we can conclude that exam supervisors are seen as an effective 
‘impediment’ to the practice of this dishonest act. 
From the calculation of Pearson’s linear correlation coefficient, we find that the probability of 
copying appears statistically and positively correlated with the variation in the benefits gained 
from successful copying, the frequency of seeing other students copying and being caught 
copying, with the familiarity of those who copy regularly, with the influence of supervisors on 
time spent studying, and with the school year in which students are enrolled. Thus, the 
perception of a higher grade resulting from copying encourages students to practice this act. 
Cheating is thus all the more probable the greater the expected difference in grades. On the 
other hand, seeing other students copy regularly seems to be associated with a higher 
probability for this practice to occur (which may reflect inefficiency in the penalisations 
applied). Furthermore, the lower the percentage of time spent studying due to the knowledge 
that there will be no exam supervisors, the higher the probability of copying. Finally, students 
who are closer to concluding their degrees are more inclined to copying. 
The probability of copying is also statistically, but in this case negatively, correlated with the 
student’s average grade (academic performance), the perception of the gravity of the act of 
copying and the severity of the penalisations. The negative balance obtained for the set of 
variables that characterise this issue and the punishments associated with the phenomenon of 
cheating reveal that students who do not know other students who copy regularly tend to 
admit that they copy less and that the awareness of the gravity of the act reduces the 
probability of copying. 
  15Table 5: Descriptive statistics 
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2,47 0,857 1 4 0.054
*** 0.007 0.139
*** 0.025 0.030 0.016 0.018 0.020 0.008
(7) See other being 
caught copying 








amount of study 
0,53                 
                        
                       
                        
0,499 0 1 0.030  -0.003  -0.005  -0.046
** 0.028 -0.036
* -0.022 
(9) Expected santion 
for copying 
3,02 0,856 1 5 0.183
*** 0.075
*** -0.029 0.017 0.029 0.032
Sanctions 
(10)  Honour  Code 0,82 0,599 0 2 -0.006  -0.087
*** -0.021 0.003 -0.040
**
(11) Age 0,55 0,497 0 1 -0.094
*** 0.026 -0.062
*** -0.025 
(12)  Idade                  
                        
                       
                     
21,51  3,072  17  59 0.355
*** 0.028 0.399
***
(13)  Schooling year 1,99 0,808 1 3 0.058
*** 0.039
**




(15)  Status_WSs 0,08 0,268 0 1      




  165. Assessing the determinants of academic cheating: model specification and presentation of 
results 
The aim here is to assess which are the main determinants of the propensity to cheat by university 
students. The nature of the data observed regarding the dependent variable [Have you ever copied 
in an exam? (1) Yes; (0) No] dictates the choice of the estimation model. Conventional 
estimation techniques (e.g., multiple regression analysis), in the context of a discrete dependent 
variable, are not a valid option. Firstly, the assumptions needed for hypothesis testing in 
conventional regression analysis are necessarily violated – it is unreasonable to assume, for 
instance, that the distribution of errors is normal. Secondly, in multiple regression analysis 
predicted values cannot be interpreted as probabilities – they are not constrained to fall in the 
interval between 0 and 1.
6 The approach used, therefore, will be to analyse each situation in the 
general framework of probabilistic models. 
Prob (event j occurs) = Prob (Y=j) = F[relevant effects: parameters]. 
In the model of cheating likelihood, it is believed (cf. Section 2) that a set of factors, such as 
students’ expected benefits/costs of copying, contextual factors, country of origin, among other 
variables, gathered in a vector X, explain the outcome, so that 
.  ) , ( 1 ) 0 ( Pr ) , ( ) 1 ( Pr β β X F Y ob and X F Y ob − = = = =
0 ) 1 ( Pr lim 1 ) 1 ( Pr lim = = = =
−∞ → ′ +∞ → ′ Y ob and Y ob
X X β β
The set of parameters β reflects the impact of changes in X on the likelihood of ‘copying’. The 
problem at this point is to devise a suitable model for the right-hand side of the equation. The 
requirement is for a model that will produce predictions that are consistent with the underlying 
theory. For a given vector of regressors, one would expect 
. 
Partly because of its mathematical convenience, the logistic distribution, Pr , has 
been used in many applications (Greene, 2003). Rearranged in terms of the log odds,
7 this 
expression is the so-called logit model.  
X e





                                                 
6 The logistic regression model is also preferred to another conventional estimation technique, discriminant analysis. 
According to Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989), even when assumptions required for discriminant analysis are satisfied, 
logistic regression still performs well. 
7 The odds of an event occurring are defined as the ratio of the probability that it will occur to the probability that it 
will not. 
  17The probability model is a regression of the following kind: 
() [] () [] ) ( 1 1 0 ) \ ( X F X F X F X Y E β β β ′ = ′ + ′ − = . Regardless of the distribution used, it is important to 
note that parameters of the model, like those of any non-linear regression model, are not 
necessarily the marginal effects. In general,  , where f(.) is the 
density function that corresponds to the cumulative distribution, F(.).  
β β β






For the logistic distribution,  . Thus, in the logit model, 
. It is obvious that these values will vary with the values of X. In 
interpreting the estimated model, it will be useful to calculate this value at, say, the means of the 
regressors and, where necessary, other pertinent values. In the logistic regression, the parameters 
of the model are estimated using the maximum-likelihood method (ML). That is, the coefficients 
that make observed results most “likely”, given the assumptions made about the error 
distribution, are selected. 
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The empirical assessment of the propensity to copy is based on the estimation of the following 
general logistic regression: 
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In order to have a more straightforward interpretation of the logistic coefficients, it is convenient 
to consider a rearrangement of the equation for the logistic model, in which the logistic model is 
rewritten in terms of the odds of an event occurring.  
Writing the logistic model in terms of the odds, the logit model is obtained 
i ract StudentCha gions HCode
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The logistic coefficient can be interpreted as the change in the log odds associated with a one-unit 
change in the independent variable. Then e raised to the power βi is the factor by which the odds 
change when the i
th independent variable increases by one unit. If βi is positive, this factor will be 
greater than 1, which means that the odds are increased; if βi is negative, the factor will be less 
  18than one, which means that the odds are decreased. When βi is 0, the factor equals 1, which 
leaves the odds unchanged.  
In the case data corroborates our Hypothesis 1, “The likelihood of copying is increased when the 
difference between the mark/grade the student expects in the case he/she copies compared with 
the mark/grade that he/she expects in the case of not copying is positive”, the estimate of β1 
should emerge as positive and significant for the conventional levels of statistical significance 
(that is, 1%, 5% or 10%).  
The estimates of the βs are given in Table 6 below, related with two alternative models, one 
(Model I) that does not control for the regional (NUTs III) dummy variables concerning students’ 
origin and Model II that controls it. 
 
  19Table 6: Determinants of academic dishonesty among university students (ML estimation) 
Model I  Model II 
  
β ˆ β ˆ β ˆ β ˆ  Exp( )   Exp( ) 




(2) D∆GainCopy   -0.014 0.986 -0.011 0.989 
Opportunity cost  (3) Grade   -0.133
*** 0.875 -0.124
*** 0.883 
(4) Frequency that observes the act of copying  0.513
*** 1.671 0.455
*** 1.576 
(5) Familiarity with someone that copies regularly  0.484
*** 1.623 0.521
*** 1.685 
Context - permissibility 
and permeability 
(6) Opinion regarding copying  -0.197
*** 0.822 -0.244
*** 0.783 
(7) See other being caught copying  0.475
*** 1.607 0.470
*** 1.601 
(8) Vigilantes’ influence in amount of study  0.400
*** 1.491 0.387
*** 1.472 




(10) Hcode  -0.221
*** 0.802 -0.594
*** 0.552 
(14) Gender (Fem=1)  -0.172
* 0.842 -0.145 0.865 
(15) Age  -0.014  0.986  -0.038
* 0.963 
(16) Schooling year  0.165
** 1.180 0.167
** 1.182 
(17)  Status_Assoc  0.189 1.208 0.204 1.226 
Student characteristics 
(18)  Status_worker  -0.248 0.781 -0.143 0.867 
Minho-Lima     -0.447  0.639 
Cávado     -0.558
* 0.572 
Ave     -0.260  0.771 
Grande Porto      -0.527
*** 0.590 
Tâmega     -0.514
* 0.598 
Entre Douro e Vouga      0.001  1.001 
Douro     -0.778
** 0.460 
Alto Trás-os-Montes      -1.174
** 0.309 
Baixo Vouga      -0.907
*** 0.404 
Baixo Mondego      -1.303
*** 0.272 
Pinhal Litoral      -0.626  0.535 
Pinhal Interior Norte and Pinhal Interior Sul      0.185  1.203 
Dão Lafões      -0.024  0.976 
Serra da Estrela, Beira Interior Norte & Beira Interior Sul      0.351  1.420 
Cova da Beira      -0.330  0.719 
Oeste     0.002  1.002 
Península Setúbal      -0.208  0.812 
Médio Tejo      0.454  1.574 
Lezíria Tejo      1.012  2.750 
Alentejo Litoral, Alto Alentejo & Baixo Alentejo      0.284  1.328 
Alentejo Central      0.548
* 1.730 
Algarve     -0.804
*** 0.448 
Regions 
R.A. Açores & Madeira      -0.462  0.630 











% corrected  71.4  70.5 
Nagelkerke R Square  22.2  25.4 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test  12.125 (sig=0.146) 7.550  (sig=0.479) 
Significant at 
*** 1%; 
** 5% and 
* 10%. 
  206. Main results and conclusions 
According to Hosmer and Lemeshow’s test both models reveal a good fit.
8 It is also clear that the 
fact that estimates are robust in the sense that controlling or not for the regional origin of students 
does not change significantly the magnitude, the significance or the signs of those estimates. 
Excluding gender and age coefficients for all the remaining variables in both models, the sign and 
significance of the coefficients are similar.  
The expected gain in terms of a higher grade when copying is successful is statistically 
significant and the correspondent coefficient has the expected (positive) sign, corroborating 
therefore Hypothesis 1. According to our results, the odds ratio
9 changes by about 1.8 when the 
difference between the mark students expect if they copy is positive when compared with the 
mark they expect if they do not copying. However, nothing can be concluded concerning the 
absolute value of the difference between expected marks (between copying and not copying) and 
the odds of copying. In this line, Hypothesis 2 – “The probability of copying is higher the greater 
the difference between the mark students say they expect if they copy and the mark if no copying 
takes place” – cannot be corroborated by our data. The student’s academic performance, assessed 
by his/her grade negatively influences the propensity to commit fraud – the higher the student’s 
grade (i.e., the higher the opportunity cost) the lower, on average, the probability of copying.  
Copying-favourable environments – proxied by the frequency with which students observe the 
act of copying, the familiarity with someone that copies regularly and students’ opinion regarding 
copying – are associated with a higher propensity to commit this illegal phenomenon. The 
negative and significant sign of the coefficient associated to the last variable indicates that the 
more serious copying is, the lower the propensity of students to commit that act. In summary, 
Hypothesis 3 – “In copying-favourable environments where permissibility and permeability 
towards copying is high, students’ propensity to copy tends to be higher” - is confirmed. 
Our results also show that those students who admit to studying less when there are no 
supervisors have a higher propensity to copy in exams. Additionally, the negative sign related to 
estimate of the severity of the sanctions confirms Hypothesis 4, since the higher and more serious 
                                                 
8 This test null hypothesis refers that the predicted values by the model are not significantly different from the 
observed values. Given that the p-value is not significant for standard values, this hypothesis is not rejected, leading 
us to the conclusion that both models foresee the reality reasonably well. 
9 Ratio of the probability of copying to the probability of not copying. 
  21the penalisations as perceived by students, fewer are the incentives they have to perpetrate 
dishonest behaviours. Even though having seen other students being caught copying has a 
positive influence on the probability of copying, this outcome combined with the previous results, 
leads to the conclusion that existing sanctions have no efficient effects. Furthermore, the 
existence of ‘codes of honour’ or any written form which sets forth the conduct and sanction 
applied in a situation where copying is detected reflects a lower propensity to copy, confirming 
therefore Hypothesis 5 – “In universities where ‘codes of honour’ exist, the propensity to copy 
among students is lower”.  
The school year in which students are enrolled arises here as the most (statistically) important 
student characteristic determining cheating behaviour. Results reveal that the closer a student is 
to concluding his/her degree, the higher the odds of copying. Gender is (statistically) relevant 
when we do not control for the regional origin of the students (Model I) – here the negative sign 
of the coefficient estimate means that, ceteris paribus, female students are less prone to commit 
fraudulent acts. Age emerges as a negative relevant determinant when we control for regional 
factors reflecting the fact that, on average, all other factors remaining constant, senior students 
are less likely to perpetrate illegal acts than their younger counterparts.  
Interestingly, when we control for a set of determinants of cheating behaviour, student status fails 
to be a statistically relevant variable – all else being constant, having AM or WS status when 
compared to the ‘regular’ student status does not seems to result in a different attitude towards 
cheating. 
There is a significant heterogeneity in copying propensity in terms of regions. In fact, as we 
detailed in Section 4, students who reside on a permanent basis in southern, inland regions, 
especially in Alentejo-related areas, present a significantly higher propensity to academic fraud 
than students from other areas of Portugal. This descriptive analysis does not however control for 
other fraud determinants, namely gender, age, grade, and so forth. The estimated Model II shows 
that controlling for a reasonable number of factors that are likely to influence students’ 
perception of cheating, students coming from regions such as Baixo Mondego and Alto Trás-os-
Montes reveal substantially lower (around 70%) odds of copying than those coming from Grande 
Lisboa (the default region). The odds of copying are forty per cent lower in students resident in 
the northern regions of Grande Porto, Cávado and Tâmega when compared with their Lisbon 
  22counterparts. In contrast, students resident in the Alentejo Central region observe statistically 
significant higher odds (1 ) of copying than their homologous counterparts from the 
Lisbon area. From this we can conclude that “The propensity to copy is influenced by the regions’ 
cultural systems and socially-related factors”, that is, the data seems to corroborate Hypothesis 6.  
) ( 73 .
ˆ β e =
Although beyond of the restricted scope of the present paper, it would be quite interesting and 
challenging to study in greater detail the genesis of such a diversity of regional patterns in what 
concerns academic cheating behaviours. 
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